making false statements to the government, filing false tax returns, impeding the administration of revenue laws, money laundering, and money laundering to promote unlawful activity. 2 A unique feature of the federal laws is the fact that the federal theft statute is inapplicable to cases in which the wrongdoer is alleged to have stolen funds from a charity, because the statute applies only to property belonging to the federal government. 3 A fiduciary of a nonprofit organization who is alleged to have taken money from the organization for private gain will be charged with violating specific federal statutes applicable to the facts of the case, but not with the more general crime of theft. For example, mail and wire fraud are used to prosecute cases in which a scheme to defraud included the use of the mails or wire transmissions. 4 The only actions which fall outside the scope of the mail fraud statute are those in which the mails are not used, or in which use of the mails is wholly incidental to or not in furtherance of the scheme. Intrastate mailing is sufficient to trigger the statute. In contrast, a wire transmission must be interstate or foreign to fall within the purview of the wire fraud statute.
In 1984 Congress enacted a statute specifically designed to apply to those instances in which federal funds received pursuant to a federal grant program or a contract with a federal agency have been misappropriated. 5 Its purpose was "to augment the ability of the United States to vindicate significant acts of theft, fraud, and bribery involving Federal monies that are disbursed to private organizations or State and local governments pursuant to a Federal program." 6 For the statute to apply, the property wrongfully taken must be valued at $5,000 or more and the organization must have received federal "benefits" as defined in the statute. This encompasses any type of federal assistance, including grant, contract, subsidy, loan, guarantee or insurance, in excess of $10,000 in any one year during which the alleged criminal activity occurred. There is also a federal statute which prohibits submitting any false, fictitious or fraudulent claims to any federal agency. The most common violation of criminal law in the nonprofit sector is theft of charitable funds for personal use. Under modern criminal statutes, at least two separate crimes may be classified under theft: larceny and embezzlement. Larceny, originally a common law crime but one which has now been codified in almost every state, entails taking and carrying away the personal property of another with the intent to deprive the possessor of it permanently. 8 In contrast, embezzlement, a creation of statutory law intended to fill the gap in the definition of larceny, entails the wrongful appropriation of personal property that is lawfully in the possession of the defendant. 9 Officers, directors and trustees of a charity are more likely to commit embezzlement than larceny, because in most instances they will have been in lawful possession of the charity's funds. 7 18 U.S.C. §287. 8 Black's Law Dictionary, 885 (7th ed. 1999). 9 Id. at 540.
SURVEY RESULTS: CRIMINAL CASES INSERT BOX A
Nature of Charities Involved: Of the one hundred and four incidents included in the study, fifty-six involved human service providers. There was wide variety among the remaining organizations, reflecting the variety of the charitable sector. There were ten federated or causedrelated fundraising organizations, nine hospital and health care organizations, and seven church or church related organizations. Five were athletic organizations, one of which was the Salt Lake City Bid Committee for the 2002 Olympics. There were also four education and arts organizations, four foundations, three civic and community organizations, two organizations providing public housing, and two advocacy organizations. One organization was responsible for the operation and maintenance of the Congressional Cemetery, and one was an animal shelter.
Thirty-two of the charities received grants or were under contract with a state or federal agency. Of these, twelve instances involved organizations providing child care or child care related services; five ran group care homes for the physically disabled or mentally ill; four operated homeless shelters; two operated housing or mortgage insurance programs under the auspices of HUD. The remaining organizations provided a variety of human services. This group of organizations are more fully described below.
Nature of Criminal Activity and Formal Charges: In all but two instances, wrongdoers were accused of taking money from the charity or diverting property donated to the charity for their personal benefit. In the two other cases, wrongdoers were accused of misusing charitable assets. Thus, in the case of the Allegheny Health, Education, and Research Foundation of Pittsburgh, the president pleaded no contest to a single misdemeanor count of misusing charitable funds by virtue of having diverted endowment funds of a hospital to finance the organization's operating costs. In another, the president of Logan General Hospital in West
Virginia was found guilty of federal fraud charges, money laundering and failing to withhold payroll taxes when he was found to have diverted the funds of the hospital to finance a failed forprofit venture owned by the hospital.
Formal charges were brought against alleged wrongdoers in ninety-eight cases. Of these, twenty-six involved violations of federal criminal laws, twenty-three involved the conversion of funds from federal or state government agencies, nine were breaches of federal tax law. There were federal racketeering charges in three instances, federal securities charges in one instance, and federal bribery charges in one other. State theft charges were brought in fifty-five cases, state fraud charges in seven, and the charge of misapplication of charitable funds in one.
Ponzi-type schemes:
In four instances, the defendants used Ponzi-type schemes to defraud investors. In the earliest of these cases, which involved the Foundation for New Era Philanthropy, charities were defrauded, while in the other incidents individuals were victims of the fraud. Substantial amounts were involved in each instance. The scheme conducted by the Foundation for New Era Philanthropy was started in 1989, when its founder, John G. Bennett Jr., persuaded a number of large public charities and private foundations to invest their assets in a fund that the foundation was managing on the basis of his assertion that their funds would be matched by gifts from anonymous donors. The anonymous donors did not exist, and by the time the scheme was exposed in 1995, the charities had lost an estimated $135 million. Bennett pleaded guilty to 82 counts of fraud, money laundering and tax evasion and was sentenced to 12 years in prison. 10 In the three additional instances of investment fraud, each of which were aimed at individuals rather than other charities, two were conducted in the name of and for the benefit of religious organizations. One of these was operated by the Baptist Foundation of Arizona, an orga nization created to serve as the fundraising arm of the Arizona Southern Baptist Convention.
After suffering losses from bad real estate investments in the late 1980's, the officers and directors of the Foundation used a Ponzi-type scheme to finance its liabilities. The scheme was exposed in 1999 when the Foundation filed for bankruptcy protection. It was revealed that investors had lost an estimated $570 million. In 2001, the treasurer, a member of the board and the president of a subsidiary of the organizations pleaded guilty to fraud charges. In October 2002, grand jury indictments on a combined 32 charges of theft, fraud and racketeering were brought against the Foundation's president, its general counsel, two board members, and a consultant to the Foundation. The case was pending as of August 2003.
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The second Ponzi-type scheme involving individual investors was conducted by Greater
Ministries International of Tampa, Florida whose officers claimed they were investing in silver and gold mines which, in fact, did not exist. The losses to investors were estimated to be $353 million. After the scheme was exposed in 1998, federal prosecutors charged five church officials, including the president, with fraud and conspiracy. All were convicted. Position of Persons Involved: Fifty-six cases involved the executive director, thirty-one the president and one the chief executive officer of the charity; in ten the treasurer was implicated; and in eleven it was the directors or trustees. In twenty-two instances, the wrongdoer was also identified as the "founder" or original donor of the organization.
In five instances the individual defendants were repeat offenders. In three cases, the wrongdoer had been convicted of embezzlement from another charity; 14 in one the defendant, who was convicted of embezzlement, had previously been fired from another charity amid allegations of embezzlement; 15 and in the fifth, the defendant, who was subsequently convicted of embezzlement, was reported to have lost his CPA license and was accused by business partners of misappropriating money. 16 In another case involving repeat violations, two officers of Ocean House Center, a charity that operated an adult care facility for the mentally ill in New York were indicted for fraud.
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One year later, the New York Attorney General filed a civil suit seeking removal of eleven officers and board members and restitution. 18 It was revealed in court papers that the brother-inlaw of the executor director of Ocean House had been the executive director of its predecessor 13 foundations -a subset of tax-exempt charitable organizations -which engage in certain acts of self-dealing. 26 In 1996, Congress imposed similar limitations and similar tax penalties on fiduciaries of publicly supported charities who receive "Excess Benefits" from self-dealings and other financial arrangements with the charity. 27 These limitations apply to persons who are in a position to exercise substantial influence over the charity, a definition which effectively includes all directors, trustees and officers. its terms; in others, the parties can agree to retain confidentiality, making it even more difficult to assess the extent of wrongdoing and the scope of corrections. 29 State Law and Regulation: State laws, both statutes and common law, define the duties of charitable fiduciaries. Directors, trustees and officers of a charity owe a duty of loyalty to the organization which in effect prohibits them from making a profit at the expense of the organization. Fiduciaries also owe a duty of care, which varies depending on the state in which the charity is located, the legal form of the organization and, in some instances, the terms of the document under which it was established. Acts involving gross negligence are uniformly proscribed, while in most jurisdictions the duty of care is interpreted by applying a "Business Judgment Rule" under which fiduciaries are totally protected from liability for business judgments having a plausible basis of rationality, involving no conflicting interest, and having been made on a reasonably informed basis. 30 Regulation of charities is the province of the state equity courts, while state attorneys general have the power, which is in most instances exclusive, to apply to the court to correct breaches of fiduciary duty. There is a wide range of equitable remedies available to the courts.
They can compel accountings and issue injunctions prohibiting acts that will further damage the charity. They can remove fiduciaries and appoint new fiduciaries or receivers to take over the administration of the charity.
Despite the fact that power to correct abuses lies with the courts, attorneys general increasingly rely on a threat of litigation to correct abuses. Reliance on settlement agreements has long been a common practice in criminal and administrative law, but is new in regard to charities. It has a distinct advantage for state attorneys general whose offices are chronically underfunded and short of staff, making them ill-equipped to undertake complex litigation.
Whether the terms of a settlement are made public will depend on the parties involved; thus, as is the case with the IRS and the federal prosecutors, the exact extent of wrongdoing and correction cannot be readily ascertained.
SURVEY RESULTS: BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY CASES INSERT BOX B
Nature of Charity Involved: Of the fifty-four organizations involved in breaches of fiduciary duties, twenty were human service providers, eleven were education and arts organizations, five were organizations providing public housing, five were hospital and health care organizations, five were foundations, three were federated or cause-related fundraising organizations, three were athletic organizations, one was a church or church related organization, and one provided management services for private foundations. Eleven of the charities received grants or were conducting activities under contract with a state or federal agency.
Nature of Fiduciary Duties Breached: The allegations of wrongdoing involved breaches of the duties of loyalty and care. Misuse of assets for personal benefit was present in twenty cases, self-dealing in eighteen, payment of excessive compensation in fourteen cases, and excessive expenditures in another eight. In four incidents, the allegations involved making improper investments, in four improper loans to insiders, in three maintaining inadequate records, in two improper use of restricted funds, and in another two failure to meet the payout requirements by a private foundation. The officers of five charities were accused of failing to carry out their organizations' charitable missions, in each case activities financed by HUD for which the organizations received state and federal funding.
Position of Persons Involved: Twenty-seven cases were brought against directors or trustees; twenty-three involved an executive director, seventeen implicated the president, four the chief executive officer, two were brought against the treasurer, and four against the charity itself.
In thirteen instances, the wrongdoer was also identified as the "founder" or original donor of the organization.
How the Prohibited Activity Came to Light: Seven incidents were uncovered during an audit conducted by a governmental agency from which the charity received grants or was under contract. In eighteen instances, the wrongdoing was first identified during routine internal audits or was discovered by board members, employees or donors, while in eleven instances the wrongdoing was first detected in the course of newspaper investigations.
Prosecuting Agency: Thirty-seven of the investigations were instituted by the state attorney general and twenty-one of these resulted in the filing of a civil lawsuit. The largest number of cases, nine, were brought by the attorney general in New York; four by the attorney general in California; four by the attorney general in Minnesota; three by the attorney general in
Texas and two each in Illinois, Massachusetts, Oregon, and Tennessee. In seven cases the charity was audited by an agency from which the charity received grants or was under contract, and five cases were investigated by the IRS. In one instance, the district attorney was involved in the investigation and in another the U.S. Attorney investigated.
One of the basic tenets of the law of charity is that the standing required to bring suit to enforce proper administration of charitable funds and compliance with the duties of loyalty and prudence is limited in almost every jurisdiction to the attorney general or to persons who can demonstrate a particular and close interest in the operation of the charity. Much criticism has been expressed of the doctrine of limited standing, particularly because of the fact that all attorneys general have limited funds and most have limited interest in enforcement of charities.
These critics would broaden the standing rules to provide greater oversight of fiduciary behavior and consequently greater accountability. 31 It is not possible to draw definitive conclusions from the results of this survey as to whether broadening the standing requirement would have increased the number of instances in which breach of fiduciary duty would be brought to the attention of the courts. Compared with the number of criminal cases, it would appear that there is more that could be done to correct abuses, particularly if more attorneys general were interested in, willing, and possessed of sufficient funds to bring fiduciaries to court.
Outcomes: Of the fifty-four cases in this survey, in twenty-one formal charges were filed by the attorney general. Of these, four resulted in court decrees and ten were settled. The attorney general settled four additional cases. One charity was cleared, and there were eight instances in which allegations were made and no further action was reported.
The results of these actions included removal of officers or directors in ten instances, resignation of officers or directors in sixteen, restitution or imposition of fines in thirteen instances and new financial controls implemented in eight cases. Six charities were dissolved or their government contracts terminated, and, in one case involving charges of self-dealing, the attorney general reviewed the actions and found no improper activity. It was reported in one case that the terms of the settlement between the attorney general and the president and trustees of a charity included barring the wrongdoers from serving on the board of a nonprofit organization in the state without the attorney general's approval. In another case that was pending in August 2003, in which criminal charges had also been filed, the attorney general filed a civil suit against the president and trustees of a charity to recover funds, remove the wrongdoers and bar them from serving with any nonprofit organization in the state. organizations. Eleven additional cases in their study involved instances of neglect and abuse, including sexual abuse of children. Nine charities identified in the second study did not meet the criteria for inclusion in this review.
On the basis of their first survey, Gibelman and Gelman concluded that the principal source of wrongdoing was a failure of governance, specifically lack of appropriate oversight and a failure to institute or maintain accountability mechanisms, thereby creating situations ripe for exploitation. They recommended clarifying board responsibilities, establishing and maintaining internal controls to eliminate any possibility of fraud or deception, promoting board development and identifying new, trained and committed board members and better staff. Without these changes, they predicted that government would take action to tighten regulations and independent watchdog agencies may well become more vigilant in their oversight. No suggestions were made, however, as to the scope of government actions that might or should be taken.
In their second study, Gibelman and Gelman sought to analyze the managerial track record of faith-based organizations in the delivery of social services to determine the validity of arguments raised by those who support increasing public funding of social services by religious groups that these groups would be less immune to scandal than their secular counterparts. The findings in this study confirmed the conclusions reached in their first review, namely that the underlying issues were lack of appropriate oversight and failure to institute or maintain accountability mechanisms. "[T]he sanctity afforded religion does not make faith-based institutions immune from the types of wrongdoings that occur among secular nonprofits."
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Beyond that, they believed it was not possible to draw comparisons as to the extent of wrongdoing or its nature. 
CONCLUSIONS
Accepting the limitations noted in the introduction -notably that the information on which the study is based comes from press reports, and that much information about wrongdoing is not available to the public -it is nonetheless possible to draw some conclusions about the nature of wrongdoing in the charitable sector and the effectiveness of government regulatory efforts.
One hundred and fifty-two incidents of wrongdoing during a seven-year period from a universe of an estimated 1.4 million organizations reinforces an initial impression that there may be serious under-reporting, and an untold number of incidents that do not come to light due to provisions in state and federal law guaranteeing privacy. This is well-understood in regard to the federal tax laws, but possibly not as well comprehended when state regulation is considered.
Further, given the fact that less than half of the states maintain active, funded programs regulating the behavior of charitable fiduciaries, the number of state investigations and prosecutions, compared with the federal, is noteworthy. Given the apparent rate of success of the prosecutions, it is likely that enhanced enforcement programs would increase the amount of The amount of money diverted from charities appears large when the Ponzi-type schemes are included in the tally; without them, the total claimed by prosecutors to have been stolen or diverted, $177 million, is relatively modest in comparison with the $2 trillion of assets estimated to be held by charities nationwide.
Although not directly pertinent to this study, it is worth noting the wide discrepancy in the severity of sentencing, a subject that warrants further review. Where in one instance, theft of $21,000 resulted in a twelve-year prison sentence, in another, a defendant found guilty of theft of more than $800,000 was sentenced to fourteen months in prison. uncovering criminal wrongdoing appeared slight, particularly when contrasted with its role in reporting on breaches of fiduciary duty.
As to the fifty-four instances in which individuals and organizations were alleged to have breached the fiduciary duties of loyalty and prudence, the smaller total number and the fewer federal cases are confirmation that these duties are defined primarily under state, not federal laws and that, with a few exceptions, authorized state officials, notably attorneys general, have possessed neither the personnel nor funds to pursue cases of this nature.
The preponderance of officers charged with wrongdoing lends support to the conclusion of Gibelman and Gelman that the root cause of wrongdoing is a failure of governance, although in the fiduciary duty cases, the laws of some states afford a high degree of protection to board members, making it difficult to build a case of breach of duty.
On the other hand, the outcomes of the fiduciary duty cases demonstrate the important role state regulation can play in protecting charitable funds, whether by terminating or reorganizing charities or removing and replacing fiduciaries who have breached their duties.
Two basic sets of questions are raised by the study. One relates to the role of government:
specifically, whether stricter legal remedies are needed, or whether enhanced enforcement of existing laws would be sufficient to deter wrongdoing. Unfortunately, the study results do not provide an adequate basis for making informed judgments on either possibility, although the evidence regarding organizations that were apparently formed to qualify for government funding suggest at the least greater vigilance on the part of government contracting agencies. 
